We re-examine and extend the findings from the recent paper by Dumitrescu et al. [11] who studied American and game options in a particular market model using the nonlinear arbitragefree pricing approach developed in El Karoui and Quenez [17] . In the first part, we provide a detailed study of unilateral valuation problems for the two counterparties in an American-style contract within the framework of a general nonlinear market. We extend results from Bielecki et al. [5, 6] who examined the case of a European-style contract. In the second part, we present a BSDE approach, which is used to establish more explicit pricing, hedging and exercising results when solutions to reflected BSDEs have additional desirable properties.
Introduction
Unlike contracts of a European style, contracts of an American style are asymmetric between the two counterparties (hereafter referred to as the issuer and the holder) not only due to the opposite directions of contractual cash flows, but also due to the fact that only one party, the holder of an American option, has the right to exercise (that is, to stop and settle) an American contract before its expiration date, which we invariably denote as T . The issues of arbitrage-free pricing and rational exercising of American options within the framework of a linear market model (usually for the classical Black and Scholes model, but possibly with trading constraints, such as: no borrowing of cash or no short-selling of shares) have been studied in numerous papers, to mention just a few: Bensoussan [4] , El Karoui et al. [15] , Jaillet et al. [24] , Karatzas [26] , Karatzas and Kou [27] , Kallsen and Kühn [25] , Myneni [34] and Rogers [41] .
The goal of this work is to re-examine and extend the findings from the recent paper by Dumitrescu et al. [11] who studied American and game options within the framework of a particular imperfect market model with default using the nonlinear arbitrage-free pricing approach developed in El Karoui and Quenez [17] . In contrast to [11] , we place ourselves within the setup of a general nonlinear arbitrage-free market, as introduced in Bielecki et al. [5, 6] , and we examine general properties of fair and acceptable unilateral prices. We also obtain more explicit results regarding pricing, hedging and break-even times for the issuer and rational exercise times for the holder using a BSDE approach without being specific about the dynamics of underlying assets, but by focusing instead on pertinent general features of solutions to reflected BSDEs.
Let us introduce some notation for a generic nonlinear market model. Let (Ω, G, G, P) be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness, where the filtration G = (G t ) t∈[0,T ] models the flow of information available to all traders. For convenience, we assume that the initial σ-field G 0 is trivial. Moreover, all processes introduced in what follows are implicitly assumed to be G-adapted and, as usual, any semimartingale is assumed to be càdlàg. For simplicity of notation, we assume throughout that the trading conditions are identical for the issuer and the holder, although this assumption can be relaxed without any difficulty since we examine unilateral valuation and hedging problems. Let T = T [0,T ] stand for the class of all G-stopping times taking values in [0, T ]. We adopt the following definition of an American contingent claim.
By convention, all cash flows of a contract are described from the perspective of the issuer. Hence when a cash flow is positive for the issuer, then the cash amount is paid by the holder and received by the issuer. Obviously, if a cash flow is negative for the issuer, then the cash amount is transferred from the issuer to the holder. For instance, when dealing with the classical case of an American put option written on a stock S, we assume that the payoff to the issuer (respectively, the holder) equals X h τ = −(K − S τ ) + (respectively, X h τ = (K − S τ ) + ) if the option is exercised at time τ by the holder. This is formalized through the following definition of an American contingent claim. Note that the superscript h in X h is used to emphasize that only the holder has the right to exercise and hence to stop the contract; this can be contrasted with the case of a game option (see, e.g., Kifer [28, 29] and the references therein) where the covenants stipulate that both parties may exercise and hence stop the contract. Definition 1.1. An American contingent claim with the G-adapted, càdlàg payoff process X h is a contract between the issuer and the holder where the holder has the right to exercise the contract by selecting a G-stopping time τ ∈ T [0,T ] . Then the issuer 'receives' the amount X h τ or, equivalently, 'pays' to the holder the amount of −X h τ at time τ where the G-adapted payoff process X h t , t ∈ [0, T ] is specified by the contract. Note that we do not make any a priori assumptions about the sign of the payoff process X h , so it can be either positive or negative, in general.
More generally, an American contract is formally identified with a triplet C a = (A, X h , T ) where a G-adapted, càdlàg stochastic process A, which is predetermined by the contract's clauses, represents the cumulative cash flows from time 0 till the contract's maturity date T . In the financial interpretation, the process A is assumed to model all the cash flows of a given American contract, which are either paid out from the issuer's wealths or added to his wealth via the value process of his portfolio of traded assets.
By symmetry, an analogous interpretation applies to the holder of an American contract and, obviously, any amount received (respectively, paid) by one of the parties is paid (respectively, received) by the other one. Note, however, that the price of the contract C a , which is exchanged at its initiation (by convention, at time 0), is not included in the process A so that we set A 0 = 0. This convention is motivated by the fact that the contract's price before the deal is made is yet unspecified and thus it needs to be determined through negotiations between the counterparties and we will argue that unilateral pricing does not yield a common value for the initial price of an American contract, in general.
When examining the valuation of an American contract at any time t ∈ [0, T ], we implicitly assume that it has not yet been exercised and thus the set of exercise times available at time t to its current holder is the class T [t,T ] of all G-stopping times taking values in [t, T ]. In principle, one could consider two alternative conventions regarding the payoff upon exercise: either (A.1) the cash flow upon exercise at time t equals A t − A t− + X h t or (A.2) if a contract is exercised at time t, then the cash flow A t − A t− is waived, so the only cash flow occurring at time t is X h t . Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we work under covenant (A.1) and we acknowledge that the choice of a particular settlement rule may result in a different price for an American contract C a , in general. Of course, this choice is immaterial when the process A is continuous or, simply, when it vanishes, so that the contract reduces to a pair (X h , T ).
In the classical linear market model, if the terminal payoff of a contract is negative (or positive), then it is easy to recognize whether the fair price for a given party should be positive (or negative) and thus it is less important to keep track of signs of cash flows. In contrast, in a nonlinear setup it may occur, for instance, that each party would like to sell a contract for a positive respective price and thus it is not reasonable to make any a priori assumptions about the signs of prices.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we work in an abstract nonlinear setup, meaning that we only make fairly general assumptions about the nonlinear dynamics of the wealth process of self-financing strategies. The main postulates of that kind are the monotonicity properties of the wealth (see Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2). We examine general properties of fair and profitable prices for the two counterparties, the issuer and the holder. In particular, we built upon papers by Bielecki et al. [5, 6] where the arbitrage-free valuation of European contingent claims in nonlinear markets was examined. In Section 3, we re-examine and extend a BSDE approach to the valuation of American options in nonlinear market initiated by El Karoui and Quenez [17] and continued in Dumitrescu et al. [11] . Our main goal is to show that unilateral acceptable prices for an American contract C a can be characterised in terms of solutions to reflected BSDEs driven by a multi-dimensional continuous semimartingale S. For the sake of concreteness, we postulate in Section 3 that the wealth process V = V (y, ϕ, A) satisfies
where y ∈ R is the initial wealth at time 0 of a trading strategy ξ (recall that A 0 = 0). However, in order to keep the ntation comprehensive, we do not explicitly specify the process S or generator g but instead we make assumptions about solutions to the SDE (14) and the BSDE (17) .
ϕ. It is assumed throughout that the processes D, X h and the wealth process V (y, ϕ, D) are càdlàg and G-adapted. We will gradually make more assumptions about the dynamics of wealth processes.
Benchmark Wealth
An important feature of the nonlinear arbitrage-free approach is the concept of the benchmark wealth V b (x) with respect to which arbitrage opportunities of a given trader are quantified and assessed. As in [5, 6] , a simple and natural candidate for the benchmark wealth can be given by the equality V b (x) = V 0 (x) where, for an arbitrary initial endowment x ∈ R of a trader, we set for all t ∈ [0, T ]
where the risk-free lending (respectively, borrowing) cash account B 0,l (respectively, B 0,b ) is used for unsecured lending (respectively, borrowing) of cash. Note that V 0 (x) represents the wealth process of a trader who decided at time 0 to keep his initial cash endowment x in either the lending (when x ≥ 0) or the borrowing (when x < 0) cash account and who is not involved in any other trading activities between the times 0 and T . Since the idea of the benchmark wealth is immaterial for valuation in linear market models and thus it is rarely encountered in works on arbitrage-free valuation, although it corresponds to the well-known economic concept of opportunity costs. It thus important to make few comments on its relevance, scope and limitations.
On the one hand, we acknowledge that the idea of unilateral pricing based on an initial portfolio of a trader can be rejected as unrealistic. It is thus worth stressing that even when we set
, meaning that the initial endowments of traders are completely ignored, the asymmetry in their respective unilateral prices will show up as a result of nonlinearity of the wealth dynamics, so that this assumption would not give an essential simplification of our results and findings.
On the other hand, it would also be possible to assume that each trader is endowed with an initial portfolio of assets (including also the savings account B 0,l and B 0,b , which means that he could be either a borrower or a lender of cash) with the current market value x at time 0 (ignoring bid-ask spreads and transaction costs). Then V b (x) could represent the wealth process of his static portfolio. Assume, for instance, that a trader has an initial portfolio of assets α 0 and cash β 0 with the (static) terminal values V T (α 0 ) and V 0 T (β 0 ), respectively. Suppose that the risky portfolio α 0 is not used for his hedging purposes but a (positive or negative) amount x 1 from the cash account β 0 is used to establish the hedge. Then the benchmark wealth
and the hedger's total wealth, inclusive of the price p for the contract entered at time 0 and the hedging strategy ϕ, equals
It is clear that it would be more difficult to analyze the case of a dynamic benchmark portfolio, although in principle this is possible. For the sake of conciseness, we are not going to study these cases in what follows, but we stress that all results in this work are valid for any specifications of the benchmark wealth V b (x 1 ) and V b (x 2 ) for the issuer and the holder, respectively. It suffices to assume that they are G-adapted and càdlàg stochastic processes.
Unilateral Fair Prices
We consider an extended market model M p (C a ) in which an American contract C a is traded at time 0 at some initial price p where p is an arbitrary real number. We first give a preliminary analysis of unilateral fair valuation of an American contract by its issuer who is endowed with the pre-trading initial wealth x 1 ∈ R and the corresponding benchmark wealth process V b (x 1 ).
Issuer's Fair Prices
We start by introducing the following conditions. Since the process A is fixed throughout, to alleviate notation, we will frequently write V (x 1 +p, ϕ) instead of V (x 1 +p, ϕ, A) when dealing with the issuer. By the same token, we will later write V (x 2 − p, ψ) instead of V (x 2 − p, ψ, −A) when examining trading strategies of the holder.
Definition 2.1. We say that a triplet (p, ϕ, τ ) ∈ R × Ψ(x 1 + p, A) × T satisfies:
For brevity, we will write (p, ϕ, τ ) ∈ (AO) if a triplet (p, ϕ, τ ) satisfies condition (AO); an analogous convention will be applied to other conditions introduced in Definition 2.1.
If property (SH) is satisfied by a triplet (p, ϕ, τ ), then we say that an issuer's superhedging at time τ arises. Note that, from the optional section theorem, condition (SH) holds for a pair (p, ϕ) ∈ R × Ψ(x 1 +p, A) and all τ ∈ T if and only if (p, ϕ) is such that the inequality
is valid for every t ∈ [0, T ]. This simple observation justifies the following definition of property (SH) for a pair (p, ϕ).
Property (AO) of a triplet (p, ϕ, τ ) is referred to as the issuer's strict superhedging (or the issuer's arbitrage opportunity) at time τ . Definition 2.3. We say that a pair (p, ϕ) ∈ R × Ψ(x 1 + p, A) satisfies condition (AO) if a triplet (p, ϕ, τ ) complies with condition (AO) for every τ ∈ T . Then we also say that (p, ϕ) creates an issuer's arbitrage opportunity in the extended market M p (C a ).
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of Definition 2.3.
and thus an issuer's arbitrage opportunity arises in the extended market M p (C a ).
We say that no issuer's arbitrage arises for (p, ϕ) at τ if (p, ϕ, τ ) satisfies condition (NA). It readily seen that if a triplet (p, ϕ, τ ) fails to satisfy (NA), then it fulfills (AO) and thus an issuer's arbitrage opportunity arises at time τ for the issuer's strategy (p, ϕ). By convention, we henceforth set inf ∅ = ∞ and sup ∅ = −∞.
. Hence the set of issuer's fair prices equals
and the upper bound for issuer's fair prices is given by
If the equality p
and called the issuer's maximum fair price for C a .
To alleviate notation, the variables (x 1 , C a ) will be sometimes suppressed and thus we will write
Assumption 2.1. The forward monotonicity property holds: for all x, p ∈ R, ϕ ∈ Ψ(x + p, A) and p ′ > p (respectively, p ′ < p), there exists a trading strategy ϕ
Lemma 2.2. Let Assumption 2.1 be satisfied. If p ∈ H f,i (x 1 ), then for any p ′ < p we have that
Proof. We argue by contradiction. If H f,i (x 1 ) = ∅, then p f,i = −∞. Let us now consider the case where H f,i (x 1 ) = ∅. Assume that p ∈ H f,i (x 1 ) and a number p ′ < p is not an issuer's fair price. Then there exists ϕ
Consequently, by Assumption 2.1, there exists ϕ ∈ Ψ(x 1 + p, A) such that a triplet (p, ϕ, τ ) complies with (AO) for every τ ∈ T . This clearly contradicts the assumption that p belongs to H f,i (x 1 ) and thus we conclude that the asserted properties are valid. ✷ The bounded gain condition (BG ε ) stipulates that issuer's gains associated with a triplet (p, ϕ, τ ) are bounded from above by ε. It leads to the following definition of an issuer's superhedging cost with negligible gain. Definition 2.5. We say that p ∈ R is an issuer's superhedging cost with negligible gain for C a if for every ϕ ∈ Ψ(x 1 + p, A) such that condition (SH) is satisfied by (p, ϕ) ∈ R × Ψ(x 1 + p, A) and for every ε > 0, there exists a
The set of all issuer's superhedging costs with negligible gain for C a is denoted by H n,i (x 1 ), that is, 
. It is possible to suppose that there exists a δ > 0 such that for every ϕ ′ ∈ R × Ψ(
Then it is obvious that both p and p + δ are issuer's superhedging costs with negligible gain.
Let us finally introduce a stopping time related to the break-even condition (BE) introduced in Definition 2.1.
Note that even when the pair (p, ϕ) is fixed, the uniqueness of an issuer's break-even time τ is not ensured, in general. Obviously, any issuer's break-even time can be formally classified as one of the exercise times available to the holder of C a but, as we will argue in what follows, an issuer's break-even time is unlikely to also be a rational exercise time for the holder. This is due to the fact that it may not actually always be advantageous for the holder to exercise at a stopping time that causes the issuer to break even or prohibits the issuer's arbitrage opportunities. Firstly, usually the holder is not informed about the issuer's trading strategy. Secondly, the holder should be behaving in a rational way for his own payoff and hedging abilities. A holder's rational exercise time can be typically identified with a particular instance of a holder's break-even time, which is introduced in Definition 2.8. The earliest issuer's break-even time will be later denoted as τ * ,i , whereas for the earliest holder's rational exercise time we will use the symbol τ * ,h .
Holder's Fair Prices
Let us now analyze the holder's fair pricing problem for C a . We assume that he is endowed with the pre-trading initial wealth x 2 ∈ R and his computation refer to the benchmark wealth process
when there is no danger of confusion.
Property (AO ′ ) (respectively, (SH ′ )) is called the strict superhedging (respectively, superhedging) condition for the holder. Note that the bounded loss property (BL ′ ε ) means that the holder's losses are bounded from below by −ε. Condition (BE ′ ) leads to the following definition.
The concept of a holder's arbitrage opportunity reflects the fact that the holder has the right to exercise an American contract, that is, to conveniently choose a stopping time τ at which the contract is settled and terminated. Specifically, a holder's arbitrage opportunity in
Hence the set of holder's fair prices equals
and the lower bound for the holder's fair prices is given by
If the equality
Definition 2.10. We say that p ∈ R is a holder's cost with negligible loss if for every ε > 0 there exists a pair (ψ,
The set of all holder's costs with negligible loss for C a is denoted by H n,h (x 2 ), that is,
Superhedging Costs
The concepts of a (strict) superhedging strategy and the associated cost for the issuer and the holder are fairly standard. For the issuer, they are based on conditions (SH) and (AO), respectively, whereas for the holder they hinge on conditions (SH ′ ) and (AO ′ ), respectively. This means that for the issuer we need to impose some conditions that are valid for every τ ∈ T , whereas for the holder it suffices to postulate that the analogous conditions are satisfied for some τ ∈ T .
Issuer's Superhedging Costs
We first introduce the notion of the lower bound for issuer's strict superhedging costs.
Definition 2.11. The lower bound for issuer's strict superhedging costs for C a is given by p
where
If the equality p a,i (x 1 , C a ) = min H a,i (x 1 ) holds, then it is denoted asp a,i (x 1 , C a ) and called the issuer's minimum strict superhedging cost for C a .
It is readily seen that H a,i (x 1 ) is the complement of H f,i (x 1 ) and thus, in view of Lemma 2.2, the equality p
is satisfied under Assumption 2.1. More precisely, we deal with the following alternative: either
or
Definition 2.12. The lower bound for issuer's superhedging costs for C a is given by p
To avoid this problematic situation, we introduce Assumption 2.2, which ensures that p
. Obviously, Assumption 2.2 is stronger than Assumption 2.1. Assumption 2.2. The forward strict monotonicity property holds: for all x, p ∈ R, ϕ ∈ Ψ(x + p, A) and p ′ > p (respectively, p ′ < p), there exists a trading strategy ϕ
Proof. Let us first assume that
Since Assumption 2.2 holds, it is clear that for an arbitrary p ∈ H s,i (x 1 ) and any ε > 0, there exists a strategy ϕ ′ ∈ Ψ(x 1 + p + ε) such that condition (AO) is satisfied by the pair
. From the arbitrariness of p ∈ H s,i (x 1 ) and ε > 0, we infer that p
. From the discussion after Definition 2.12, we get p
. Hence the asserted equalities are satisfied in that case as well. ✷
Holder's Superhedging Costs
Let us now examine the holder's strict superhedging costs. 
Similarly as for the issuer, we also introduce the concept of a superhedging strategy for the holder.
Definition 2.14. The upper bound for holder's superhedging costs for
and called the holder's maximum superhedging cost for C a . 
It is clear that H
where the last equality is known to hold under Assumption 2.1. Let us now assume that
. Hence the asserted equalities are valid in that case as well. ✷
Unilateral Acceptable Prices
Our next goal is to analyze the following problem: under which assumptions a suitably defined replication cost of an American contract is also its maximum (respectively, minimum) fair price for the issuer (respectively, the holder). The answer to this question will lead us to the crucially important concept of unilateral acceptable prices computed by the counterparties.
Issuer's Acceptable Price
We will now study the concept of replication of the contract C a by the issuer. We work hereafter under Assumption 2.2 and thus, in view of Lemma 2.4, we have that 
and called the issuer's minimum replication cost for C a .
Note that in Definition 2.15 we focus on a particular issuer's superhedging strategy for which a break-even time exists and we do not impose any restrictions on wealth processes of other trading strategies available to the issuer. Hence, in principle, for p ∈ H r,i (x 1 ), it may happen that there exists another pair, say (p, ψ), which is an issuer's strict superhedging strategy. This would mean that the issuer's replication cost is not an issuer's fair price for C a . To eliminate this shortcoming of Definition 2.15, in the next definition we impose, in addition, the no-arbitrage condition (NA) on all issuer's trading strategies associated with p.
Definition 2.16. The lower bound for issuer's fair replication costs for C a is given by
where Obviously, if p i (x 1 , C a ) is well defined, then it coincides withp f,r,i (x 1 , C a ). Let us examine some useful relationships between the conditions introduced in Definition 2.1.
(ii) If (p, ϕ) fail to satisfy (SH), then there exists τ ∈ T such that (p, ϕ, τ ) satisfy (NA). (iii) The following conditions are equivalent: (a) for any (p, ϕ) satisfying (SH) there exists τ ∈ T such that (p, ϕ, τ ) satisfy (BE), (b) for any (p, ϕ), there exists τ ∈ T such that (p, ϕ, τ ) satisfy (NA).
Proof. (i) The statement is an almost immediate consequence of definitions of conditions (SH), (NA) and (BE). Indeed, suppose that a pair (p, ϕ) satisfies (SH) and a triplet (p, ϕ, τ ) complies with (NA). Clearly, the inequality P(
τ (x 1 )) > 0 cannot hold and thus (p, ϕ, τ ) must satisfy (BE).
(ii) We know that if a pair (p, ϕ) satisfies (AO), then it fulfills (SH) and thus if (p, ϕ) fails to satisfy (SH), then condition (AO) is not met. Recalling that, in essence, the class of pairs (p, ϕ) satisfying (AO) is the complement of (NA), we conclude that there exists a stopping time τ ∈ T such that the triplet (p, ϕ, τ ) complies with (NA).
(iii) We first show that (a) implies (b). We know from (ii) that if a pair (p, ϕ) does not satisfy condition (SH), then there exists τ ∈ T such that (p, ϕ, τ ) complies with (NA). If (p, ϕ) satisfies (SH) then, from condition (a), there exists τ ∈ T such that the triplet (p, ϕ, τ ) fulfills (BE), and thus it also satisfies (NA). Let us now assume that condition (b) is met. Then, from part (i), condition (a) holds as well. ✷ In view of (8), the proof of the following lemma is obvious and thus it is omitted.
In the next result, we study the basic properties of issuer's costs.
then it is a singleton and the issuer's acceptable price
Proof. We start by proving (i)
Parts (ii) and (iii) are easy consequences of (9) . ✷ Remark 2.2. Part (i) in Proposition 2.1 shows that if there exists a number p for which an issuer's fair replicating strategy exists and p is the unique issuer's acceptable price, his maximum fair price, minimum replication cost, and the infimum of (strict) superhedging costs (but, obviously, it is not a strict superhedging cost). We thus deal here with a highly desirable situation but, sadly, it is not easy to check whether a number p with above-mentioned properties exists. As expected, to overcome this difficulty we will impose additional assumptions on wealth processes of trading strategies. Recall that in the complete linear market, one can show that H r,i (x 1 ) = ∅ but, to the best of our knowledge, the properties of the set H f,r,i (x 1 ) have not been studied in the existing literature.
Holder's Acceptable Price
We postulate that Assumption 2.2 is satisfied with −A and thus, in view of Lemma 2.5, we have that
The notion of the holder's replication cost introduced is through the following definition.
Definition 2.18. The upper bound for holder's replication costs for C a is given by p r,h (x 2 , C a ) := sup H r,h (x 2 ) where
Equivalently,
If the equality p r,h (x 2 , C a ) = max H r,h (x 2 ) holds, then p r,h (x 2 , C a ) is denoted as p r,h (x 2 , C a ) and called the holder's maximum replication cost for C a .
To establish the existence of the holder's acceptable price, we will use the concept of the holder's fair replication costs.
Definition 2.19. The upper bound for holder's fair replication costs for C a is given by p f,r,h (x 2 , C a ) = sup H f,r,h (x 2 ) where We infer from Lemma 2.8 that
) and thus, in view of (11), we have
) and H r,h (x 2 ) are nonempty and thus we infer from
, we see that for arbitrary p 1 , p 2 ∈ H f,r,h (x 2 ) and p 3 ∈ H f,h (x 2 ) we have p 1 = p 2 ≤ p 3 and thus H f,r,h (x 2 ) is a singleton and its unique element is less than any element of H f,h (x 2 ). Consequently,p f,h and p h are well defined and they satisfy −∞ < p h =p f,h < +∞. Furthermore, H f,r,h (x 2 ) ⊆ H r,h (x 2 ) and thus the equality p h = p r,h implies that p r,h exists and coincides with p h . We conclude that (13) is valid. The proofs of statements (ii) and (iii) are straightforward in view of (12) . ✷
Unilateral Pricing Through Reflected BSDEs
The goal of this section is to re-examine and extend a BSDE approach to the valuation of American options in nonlinear market, which was initiated in the paper by Dumitrescu et al. [11] . Our main goal is to show that unilateral acceptable prices for an American contract C a can be characterized in terms of solutions to reflected BSDEs driven by a multi-dimensional continuous semimartingale S. In this section, we postulate that the wealth process V = V (y, ϕ, A) satisfies the forward equation
where y ∈ R represents the initial wealth at time 0 of a given trading strategy ξ (recall that A 0 = 0). By applying Lemma 3.1 with y 1 = x + p < x + p ′ = y 2 , f 1 = f 2 = g and z = ξ, it is easy to check that Assumption 2.2 is met when the dynamics of the wealth process are given by the SDE (14) and are uniquely specified by the initial value y and the process ξ (for instance, when g = g(t, v, z) is Lipschitz continuous with respect to v).
Dynamics of the Wealth Process
Let us first describe more explicitly the main features of the mechanism of nonlinear trading, which underpins the wealth dynamics given by (14) . We start by introducing the notation for traded assets, that is, cash accounts, risky assets, and funding accounts associated with risky assets. It should be stressed, however, that our further developments will not depend on the choice of a particular model for primary assets and trading arrangements and thus our general results are capable of covering a broad spectrum of market models.
Let S = (S 1 , . . . , S d ) stand for the collection of prices of a family of d risky assets where the processes S 1 , . . . , S d are continuous semimartingales. Continuous processes of finite variation, denoted as B 0,l and B 0,b , represent the lending borrowing unsecured cash accounts, respectively. For every j = 1, 2, . . . , d, we denote by B j,l (respectively, B j,b ) the lending (respectively, borrowing) funding account associated with the ith risky asset, and also assumed to be continuous processes of finite variation. The financial interpretation of these accounts varies from case to case (for more details, see [5, 6] ). Let us denote by B the collection of all cash and funding accounts available to a trader. For simplicity of presentation, we maintain our assumption that the issuer and the holder have identical market conditions but it is clear that this assumption is not relevant for our further developments and thus it can be easily relaxed. A trading strategy is an R 3d+2 -valued, G-adapted
where the components represent all outstanding positions in the risky assets S j , j = 1, 2, . . . , d, cash accounts B 0,l , B 0,b , and funding accounts B j,l , B j,b , j = 1, 2, . . . , d for risky assets.
Definition 3.1. We say trading strategy (y, ϕ) is self-financing for C a and we write ϕ ∈ Ψ(y, A) if the wealth process V (y, ϕ, A), which is given by Due to additional trading constraints, which depend on the particular trading mechanism, the choice of an initial value y and a process ξ is known to uniquely specify the wealth process of a selffinancing strategy ϕ ∈ Ψ(y, A). In addition, one needs also to introduce some form of admissibility of trading strategies and to postulate that the market model M = (B, S, Ψ(A)) where Ψ(A) = ∪ y∈R Ψ(y, A) is arbitrage-free in a suitable sense, for instance, regular in the sense of Bielecki et al. [5] .
Since the arbitrage-free feature of a nonlinear market was studied in El Karoui and Quenez [17] and, more recently, Bielecki et al. [5, 6] , we do not elaborate on this issue here and we refer the interested reader to these works. It is important to notice that, due to the trading constraints, differential funding costs and possibly also some additional adjustment processes, which are not explicitly stated in Definition 3.1, the dynamics of the wealth process are nonlinear, in general. We refer the reader to Bielecki et al. [5, 6] for more encompassing versions of the self-financing property of a trading strategy (see, for instance, Definition 4.5 in [6] or Definition 2.2 in [5] ) and to Nie and Rutkowski [35, 36, 37, 38] for explicit examples of nonlinear models with trading constraints and adjustments (in particular, the collateralization of contracts). We only observe that each particular trading arrangement gives rise to an explicit mapping g in the dynamics (14) of the wealth, which is sometimes quite complex, but at the same time usually fairly regular.
The following elementary lemma addresses the issue of the (strict) monotonicity of the wealth process driven by (14) . Note that since the process z is assumed to be given in the statement of Lemma 3.1, we may interpret the SDE (15) as a deterministic integral equation, which holds for almost all ω ∈ Ω.
where z is an R d -valued, G-progressively measurable stochastic process, the G-adapted process k = k 1 −k 2 is nondecreasing with k 0 = 0, and S, H are R d -valued semimartingales. Assume that (15) has a unique solution
, dt ⊗ dP-a.e. and y 1 ≥ y 2 (respectively,
Proof. If we setv t := v 
After integrating both sides from 0 to t, and noticing that the process k = k 1 − k 2 is nondecreasing and e 
Comparison Properties of Nonlinear Evaluations
We henceforth postulate that the wealth process V = V (y, ϕ, A) is governed by the SDE (14) where ξ = (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ d ) is given and the mapping g satisfies some additional assumptions. This will allow us to refer to a large body of existing literature on the theory of BSDEs and, in particular, to exploit the link between reflected BSDEs and solutions to nonlinear optimal stopping problems (see, for instance, Cvitanić and Karatzas [9] , Dumitrescu et al. [10] , El Karoui et al. [14] , Grigorova and Quenez [21] , Grigorova et al. [19, 20] , and Quenez and Sulem [42] ). Our goal in this section is to examine the valuation and hedging of American contracts for the special case where the wealth dynamics are driven by (14) . To keep our presentation concise and encompassing several alternative nonlinear market models, we will directly postulate that the associated BSDEs enjoy desirable properties, such as: the existence, uniqueness, and the strict comparison property for solutions to BSDEs, which are known to hold under various circumstances. As was already mentioned, a particular instance of a market model given by (14) has been studied in a recent paper by Dumitrescu et al. [11] .
Let us recall the standard terminology related to nonlinear evaluations generated by solutions to BSDEs (see, e.g., Chapter 3 in Peng [39] or Section 4 in Peng [40] ). Consider the following BSDE on [0, s]
where ζ s ∈ L 2 (G s ), M is a d-dimensional martingale, the process H is real-valued and G-adapted, and the generator g :
where P is the σ-field of predictable sets on Ω × [0, T ]. Assume that the BSDE (16) has a unique solution (Y, Z) in a suitable space of stochastic processes (see, e.g., [7, 36] 
The concept of the (strict) comparison property of a nonlinear evaluation is fairly standard in the theory of BSDEs. Definition 3.2. We say that the comparison property of E g,H holds if for every stopping time τ ∈ T and random variables ζ
. We say that the strict comparison property of E g,H holds if for every τ ∈ T and ζ
In view of its financial interpretation, the nonlinear evaluation E g,A associated with the BSDE
is henceforth denoted by E g,i and called the issuer's g-evaluation. In Section 3.3, we address the issuer's pricing problem and we work under the following standing assumption. Assumption 3.1. We postulate that: (i) the wealth process V = V (y, ϕ, A) of a trading strategy ϕ ∈ Ψ(y, A) satisfies (14), (ii) for any fixed y ∈ R and any process ξ such that the stochastic integral in (14) is well defined, the SDE (14) has a unique strong solution, (iii) the strict monotonicity property holds for the wealth V (y, ϕ, A) (see Assumption 2.2), (iv) for every (s,
Note that in Section 3.5, where we study the holder's pricing problem, we will use a modified version of Assumption 3.1 in which the process A is replaced by −A.
Remark 3.1. In view of Lemma 3.1 and condition (ii), condition (iii) from Assumption 3.1 is not restrictive, since it is valid for every generator g. For explicit assumptions about g ensuring that the BSDE (17) , where S is a multi-dimensional, continuous, square-integrable martingale enjoying the predictable representation property, has a unique solution and the strict comparison property of the issuer's g-evaluation E g,i holds, see Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 in Nie and Rutkowski [36] .
Issuer's Acceptable Price
We denote by X := V b (x 1 ) − X h the issuer's relative reward and we assume that the process X is square-integrable. Then, by Assumption 3.1(iv), the following BSDE on [0, T ]
has a unique solution (Y, Z) in a suitable space of stochastic processes. To study the issuer's pricing problem for an American contract C a , we make the following assumption (see, e.g., Definition 2.4 in Quenez and Sulem [42] ).
Assumption 3.2. The reflected BSDE with the lower obstacle
has a unique solution (Y, Z, K) where K is a G-predictable, càdlàg, nondecreasing process such that K 0 = 0 and K = K c + K d is its unique decomposition into continuous and jump components.
Reflected BSDEs were introduced in seminal papers by El Karoui et al. [15, 14] where they were applied to solutions of optimal stopping problems and pricing of American options. They were subsequently studied by several authors who dealt with various frameworks, to mention a few: Aazizi and Ouknine [1] , Baadi and Ouknine [2] , Crépey and Matoussi [8] , Essaky [18] , Hamadène [22] , Hamadène and Ouknine [23] , Grigorova et al. [19, 20] , Klimsiak [30, 31] , Klimsiak et al. [32] and Quenez and Sulem [42] . They have shown that Assumption 3.2 is met in many instances of our interest but, due to space limitations, we are not going to quote any particular result here. Definition 3.3. We say that v i (C a ) ∈ R is the value of the issuer's optimal stopping problem for
A stopping time τ * ∈ T is called a solution to the issuer's optimal stopping problem if
Assumption 3.3. The value v i (C a ) to the issuer's optimal stopping problem exists and satisfies
Assumption 3.4. The stopping time
(not necessarily unique) solution to the issuer's optimal stopping problem so that
Various results pertaining to Assumptions 3.2-3.4 were obtained under alternative assumptions on the generator g and the processes X and S in (19) by, among others, El Karoui et al. [14] , Grigorova et al. [19] and Quenez and Sulem [42] . Although it is common to set S = W and A = 0, an extension to a more general situation is also feasible when the generator g satisfies a suitable Lipschitz-type condition (see [36] for the case of a BSDE without reflection).
The first main result in this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Let Assumptions 3.1-3.4 be satisfied and let (Y, Z, K) be the unique solution to the issuer's reflected BSDE (19) . Then the following assertions are valid: (i) If E g,i has the strict comparison property, then
is an issuer's replicating strategy for C a . (ii) If E g,i has the strict comparison property, then the issuer's acceptable price for C a equals
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3.1 is split into three steps, which are formulated as Propositions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. ✷ We start by analyzing the issuer's minimum superhedging cost (note that Assumption 3.4 is not postulated here). Proposition 3.1. If Assumptions 3.1-3.3 are satisfied and E g,i has the comparison property, then the issuer's minimum superhedging cost is well defined and satisfies
where (Y, Z, K) is the unique solution to the reflected BSDE (19).
Proof. We first prove that p s,i ≤ Y 0 − x 1 . It suffices to show that for the initial value p ′ := Y 0 − x 1 , where Y 0 is obtained from the reflected BSDE (19), we can find an issuer's superhedging strategy, that is, there exists a trading strategy ϕ
where (Y, Z, K) is the unique solution to the reflected BSDE (19) . Then, on the one hand, the value process V = V (x 1 + p ′ , ϕ ′ ) is a unique strong solution (by Assumption 3.1(ii)) to the following SDE where the initial value V 0 = Y 0 and the process Z are fixed
On the other hand, if (Y, Z, K) solves the reflected BSDE (19) , then the process Y = Y can also be seen as a unique strong solution to the following SDE
where, once again, the initial value Y 0 = Y 0 and the processes Z and K are given. Therefore, from Lemma 3.1 with
is an issuer's superhedging strategy and thus p s,i ≤ Y 0 − x 1 .
We will now show that p s,i ≥ Y 0 − x 1 . Let us consider an arbitrary p ∈ R for which there exists ϕ ∈ Ψ(x 1 + p, A) such that (p, ϕ) satisfy (SH). If we can show that x 1 + p ≥ Y 0 , then the inequality p s,i ≥ Y 0 − x 1 will hold by the definition of the lower bound p s,i . To this end, we observe that V τ (x 1 + p, ϕ) ≥ X τ for every τ ∈ T since, by Definition 2.2, we have that V t (x 1 + p, ϕ) ≥ X t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Consequently, by applying the mapping E g,i to both sides and using the comparison property of E g,i , we obtain
Since τ ∈ T is arbitrary, we conclude that
Finally, from the first part of the proof, we know that for p In the next result, we examine the existence of an issuer's replicating strategy for C a .
Proposition 3.2. If Assumptions 3.1-3.4 are satisfied and E g,i has the strict comparison property, then the following assertions are valid: (i) the pair (Y 0 − x 1 , Z) is an issuer's replicating strategy for C a and τ i is an issuer's break-even time for the pair (Y 0 − x 1 , Z), (ii) the issuer's minimum superhedging and replication costs satisfy
Proof. From Lemma 2.7 and Proposition 3.1, we already know that Y 0 − x 1 = p s,i =p s,i ≤ p r,i and thus to establish the equalityp
, it is enough to show that the trading strategy
, which is already known to be an issuer's superhedging strategy, is also an issuer's replicating strategy for C a . We first note that the definition of τ i and the right-continuity of the processes X and Y yield the equality X τ i = Y τ i . Consequently, we have that
, where the first two equalities follow from Assumptions 3.3 and 3.4. We will now show that K τ i = 0. Since (Y, Z, K) solves the reflected BSDE (19), we also know that
From the strict comparison property of E g,i , we conclude that K τ i = 0 and thus, for all t ∈ [0, τ i ],
Finally, using the equality V 0 (Y 0 , Z) = Y 0 and the postulated uniqueness of a solution to the SDE (23) (see Assumption 3.1(ii)), we obtain the equality V t (Y 0 , Z) = Y t on [0, τ i ] and thus, in particular,
We have thus shown that τ i is an issuer's break-even time for the pair (Y 0 − x 1 , Z). We have thus shown that the pair (p ′ , ϕ ′ ) = (Y 0 , Z) is an issuer's replicating strategy for C a . ✷ The final step in establishing Theorem 3.1 and hence providing a solution to the issuer's valuation problem hinges on showing that the issuer's acceptable price is also the issuer's maximum fair price. 
Proof. It suffices to show thatp r,i belongs to H f,i (x 1 ) or, equivalently, thatp r,i < p for every p ∈ H a,i (x 1 ) (recall that H a,i (x 1 ) is the complement of H f,i (x 1 )). To this end, we will argue by contradiction. Assume thatp r,i ∈ H a,i (x 1 ) so that there exists a strategyφ ∈ Ψ(x 1 +p r,i ) such that (p r,i ,φ) satisfy (AO). Then we have, for every τ ∈ T ,
Let us now take τ = τ i . By applying the mapping E g,i to both sides, we obtain
where the last equality comes from Proposition 3.2. This is a contradiction and thus we have shown thatp (19) . Our next goal is to provide a detailed characterization of all issuer's break-even times associated with an issuer's replicating strategy (p i , ϕ ′ ). To establish Theorem 3.2, which is the second main result in Section 3.3, we will need the following additional assumption.
Assumption 3.5. The following extended comparison property for solutions to BSDEs holds: if for j = 1, 2 dY
Remark 3.3. Suitable versions of the comparison theorem for BSDEs are known and thus Assumption 3.5 can be checked to be met in several nonlinear market models (see, for instance, explicit examples analyzed in Nie and Rutkowski [36] ).
Before stating the main result in Section 3.3, let us recall the following well-known definition related to nonlinear evaluations (see, e.g., Peng [39, 40] ). Definition 3.4. We say that a G-adapted, càdlàg process Y is an E g,i -supermartingale (respectively, an 
′ is a solution to the issuer's optimal stopping problem, that is, E
Proof. Recall that if ϕ ′ = Z, then the pair (p i , ϕ ′ ) is an issuer's superhedging strategy for C a (see the proof of Proposition 3.1). It is thus is clear that assertions (i), (ii) and (iii) are equivalent.
(iii) ⇒ (iv). From the proof of Proposition 3.1, we already know that V t (x 1 + p i , ϕ ′ ) ≥ Y t ≥ X t for all t ∈ [0, T ] and thus, in particular, the inequality V τ (x 1 + p i , ϕ ′ ) ≥ Y τ ≥ X τ holds for every τ ∈ T . Since we assumed that (iii) holds, we have
. It thus remains to show that K τ ′ = 0. Since the process V = V (Y 0 , ϕ ′ ) satisfies the SDE (23), it is an E g,i -martingale and thus we obtain the following equalities E
On the one hand, for any fixed t ∈ (0, T ] the processȲ s := E
On the other hand, if (Y, Z, K) solves the reflected BSDE (19) , then for any fixed [0, t], the pair ( Y , Z) = (Y, Z) is a unique solution to the BSDE
where K is a predetermined increasing process. Therefore, in view of the extended comparison property of solutions to BSDEs (see Assumption 3.5), the inequality E g,i s,t (Y t ) ≤ Y t holds for all s ∈ [0, t] and thus Y is an E g,i -supermartingale. Moreover, similarly to the above discussion, by using the extended comparison property of solutions to BSDEs, one can show that, for any θ ∈ T , the inequality E g,i s,θ (Y θ ) ≤ Y s holds for all s ∈ [0, θ]. We will now show that for every 0
Let us assume, on the contrary, that equality (28) fails to hold. Then, using the strict comparison property of E g,i , we obtain E
This manifestly contradicts (27) and thus (28) is valid. For every 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ τ ′ , from (28), we have E
where the last equality also comes from (28) . We conclude that Y is an E g,i -martingale on [0, τ ′ ] and thus the equality K τ ′ = 0 follows.
(iv) ⇒ (iii). By assumption, Y τ ′ = X τ ′ and K τ ′ = 0 and thus the reflected BSDE (19) reduces to the following BSDE on [0, τ ′ ]
The above BSDE can also be represented in the forward manner, for t ∈ [0, τ ′ ],
where the initial value Y 0 and the process Z are given. Similarly, the wealth process V :
with initial condition V 0 = Y 0 . From the uniqueness of a solution to the above SDE, we infer that
In view of Assumption 3.3, we have that Y 0 = v i (C a ) and thus the equalities E
hold, which means that τ ′ is a solution to the issuer's optimal stopping problem.
(v) ⇒ (iv). From condition (v) and Assumption 3.3, we obtain the equality
We will now use similar arguments as in the proof of the implication (iii) ⇒ (iv). First, the process X s := E g,i s,t (X τ ′ ) solves the following BSDE
and it also satisfiesX 0 = Y 0 . Second, if (Y, Z, K) solves the reflected BSDE (19) , then the pair ( Y , Z) = (Y, Z) is a unique solution to the BSDE
where K is a predetermined increasing process and, obviously, Y 0 = Y 0 . The extended comparison property of solutions to BSDEs yields the inequality E
which is a contradiction. This shows that Y τ ′ = X τ ′ . As in the proof of the implication (iii) ⇒ (iv), we argue that Y is an E g,i -martingale on [0, τ ′ ] and thus the equality K τ ′ = 0 is satisfied.
It remains to show that the last assertion is valid. In view of Assumption 3.4, τ i is a solution to the issuer's optimal stopping problem and thus, from part (v), τ i is an issuer's break-even time for (p i , ϕ ′ ). In view of (iv), for any break-even time for for (p i , ϕ ′ ) we have that X τ ′ = Y τ ′ . The definition of τ i now shows that it is the earliest issuer's break-even time for C a . ✷
Holder's Acceptable Price
We now address the pricing, hedging and exercising problems from the perspective of the holder. The corresponding nonlinear evaluation E g,−A , which is defined through solutions to the holder's BSDE
is henceforth denoted by E g,h and called the holder's g-evaluation. For brevity, we denote by x := V b (x 2 ) + X h the holder's relative reward and we assume that the process x is square-integrable. 
has a unique solution (y, z, k) where k is a G-predictable, nondecreasing process such that k 0 = 0 and k = k c + k d is its unique decomposition into continuous and jump components.
Definition 3.5. We say that v h (C a ) ∈ R is the value of the holder's optimal stopping problem for
A stopping time τ * ∈ T is called a solution to the holder's optimal stopping problem if
The following assumptions can be justified by an independent analysis of a nonlinear optimal stopping problem. Although we take here the properties stated in Assumptions 3.7 and 3.8 for granted, it is worth to mention that they are supported by recent results in Grigorova et al. [19, 20] .
Assumption 3.7. The value v h (C a ) to the holder's optimal stopping problem exists and satisfies v h (C a ) = y 0 .
Assumption 3.8. The stopping time τ h := inf {t ∈ [0, T ] | y t = x t } is a solution to the holder's optimal stopping problem.
A salient feature of an American contract is a holder's rational exercise time, which in our framework is defined as follows. Definition 3.6. We say that τ ∈ T is a rational exercise time for the holder of C a if the contract is traded at the holder's maximum superhedging cost p s,h = p s,h (x 2 , C a ) at time 0 and there exists a strategy ψ ∈ Ψ(
In fact, we will use Definition 3.6 within the setup where the equality p r,h (x 2 , C a ) = p s,h (x 2 , C a ) holds. If, in addition, the strict comparison property for the BSDE with the driver g is satisfied, then the inequality V τ (x 2 − p r,h , ψ) ≥ x τ can be replaced by the equality V τ (x 2 − p r,h , ψ) = x τ so that a rational exercise time is also a holder's break-even time. The following theorem describes the properties of a solution to the holder's pricing problem for an American contract C a .
Theorem 3.3. Let Assumption 3.1 and 3.6-3.8 be satisfied and let (y, z, k) be a unique solution to the holder's reflected BSDE (30) . Then the following assertions hold.
(i) If E g,h has the strict comparison property, then
A holder's replicating strategy for C a is given by the triplet (p ′ , ψ ′ , τ ′ ) = (x 2 − y 0 , z, τ h ) and τ h is a holder's rational exercise time.
(ii) If E g,h has the strict comparison property, then the holder's acceptable price for
Proof. As in the case of the issuer, we split the proof into three steps, which are formulated as Propositions 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. They can be seen as the holder's counterparts of Propositions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, although their statements and proofs differ from the issuer's case. ✷ Note the Assumption 3.8 is not postulated in the next result. It is worth stressing that the equality p s,h (x 2 , C a ) = x 2 − y 0 does not necessarily hold under the assumptions of Proposition 3.4 and the holder's maximum superhedging cost p s,h (x 2 , C a ) is not necessarily well defined.
Proposition 3.4. If Assumptions 3.1 and 3.6-3.7 are satisfied and E g,h has the comparison property, then
where (y, z, k) is the unique solution to the reflected BSDE (30).
Proof. We will show that p s,h ≤ x 2 − y 0 . By the definition of the supremum, it is enough to show that x 2 − y 0 ≥ p for all p ∈ H s,h (x 2 ). From the definition of H s,h (x 2 ), we know that for any
and thus
where the last equality follows from Assumption 3.7. We have thus shown that p
. ✷ We will now give conditions under which, in particular, the holder's maximum superhedging and replication costs are well defined and we show that they are equal, that is,
Proposition 3.5. If Assumptions 3.1 and 3.6-3.8 are satisfied and E g,h has the strict comparison property, then: (i) (x 2 − y 0 , z, τ h ) is a holder's replicating strategy for C a , (ii) the holder's maximum replication cost is well defined and satisfies
Proof. We already know that x 2 − y 0 ≥ p s,h ≥ p r,h (see (12) and (33)). Hence to prove parts (i) and (ii), it suffices to show that if (y, z, k) is the unique solution to the reflected BSDE (30) 
) is a holder's replicating strategy. The wealth process
where the initial value V 0 = y 0 and the process z are given. The definition of τ h and the rightcontinuity of the processes x and y ensure that x τ h = y τ h so that
where the second equality is a consequence of Assumption 3.8, and thus we see that y 0 = E g,h 0,τ h (y τ h ). Therefore, using the strict comparison property of E g,h and simple arguments analogous to those used in the derivation of the equality K τ i = 0 in the proof of Proposition 3.2, we obtain the equality k τ h = 0. Since k t = 0 on [0, τ h ], the reflected BSDE (30) can be seen on [0, τ h ] as the forward SDE dy t = −g(t, y t , z t ) dt + z t dS t − dA t ,
where the initial value y 0 = V 0 and the process z are given. From the uniqueness of a solution to the SDE (34), it follows that V = y on [0, τ h ]. Hence V τ h = y τ h = x τ h and thus the triplet (p ′ , ψ ′ , τ ′ ) = (x 2 − y 0 , z, τ h ) is indeed a holder's replicating strategy. ✷ To complete the proof of Theorem 3.4, we need to examine the existence of the holder's acceptable price p h (x 2 , C a ). This will be done in the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 3.6. If Assumptions 3.1 and 3.6-3.8 are satisfied and E g,h has the strict comparison property, then the holder's acceptable price p h (x 2 , C a ) is well defined and
Proof. We will first show that p r,h ∈ H f,h (x 2 ). In view of (6) and (7), it is enough to prove that p r,h (x 2 , C a ) > p for every p ∈ H a,h (x 2 ). To this end, we argue by contradiction. Let us write p = p r,h (x 2 , C a ). Assume that p ∈ H a,h (x 2 ) so that there exists ( ϕ, τ ) ∈ Ψ(x 2 − p) × T such that ( p, ϕ, τ ) satisfies (AO ′ ), that is, P V τ (x 2 − p, ϕ) ≥ x τ = 1 and P V τ (x 2 − p, ϕ) > x τ > 0.
By applying the mapping E g,h , we obtain
where the last equality comes from Proposition 3.5. This is a contradiction and thus p r,h (x 2 , C a ) / ∈ H a,h (x 2 ). 
Holder's Rational Exercise Times
We conclude the paper by an analysis of the properties of holder's rational exercise times. Note that in Theorem 3.4 we work under the assertions of Theorem 3.3. It is thus known that the equality p r,h (x 2 , C a ) = p s,h (x 2 , C a ) holds and thus a stopping time τ ∈ T is a holder's rational exercise time if the contract is traded at the holder's maximum replication cost p r,h = p r,h (x 2 , C a ) at time 0 and there exists a strategy ψ ∈ Ψ(x 2 − p r,h , −A) such that V τ (x 2 − p r,h , ψ) = x τ . We thus deal here with a natural extension of the classical concept of a rational exercise time for the holder of an American option when the underlying market model is linear. Let us notice that in any complete linear market, albeit not in a general nonlinear market, any holder's rational exercise time is also a break-even time for the issuer (in particular, the equality τ h = τ i is satisfied).
Recall that G-adapted, càdlàg process Y is an E g,h -submartingale (respectively, an E g,h -martingale) on [0, T ] if Y s ≤ E g,h s,t (Y t ) (respectively, Y s = E g,h s,t (Y t )) for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . The following result gives a characterisation of all holder's rational exercise times and describes the earliest and the latest rational exercise times. Of course, results of this kind are well known from the existing literature on a classical optimal stopping problem (see, for instance, Kobylanski and Quenez [33] ). For nonlinear optimal stopping problems, the interested reader is also referred to Dumitrescu [11] and Grigorova et al. [19, 20] . Proof. Let τ ′ ∈ T be any stopping time such that conditions (i) and (ii) are met. Since y τ ′ = x τ ′ and k τ ′ = 0, we see that the triplet (y, z, k) solves the following BSDE on [0, τ ′ ] dy t = −g(t, y t , z t ) dt + z t dS t − dA t ,
which can also be written in the forward manner, for all t ∈ [0, τ ′ ], dy t = −g(t, y t , z t ) dt + z t dS t − dA t , where initial condition y 0 and the process z are given. Now we take ψ = z and we recall that p r,h (x 2 , C a ) = x 2 − y 0 (see Proposition 3.6). Hence the wealth process V = V (x 2 − p r,h (x 2 , C a ), ψ) satisfies the following SDE for all t ∈ [0, T ] dV t = −g(t, V t , z t ) dt + z t dS t − dA t , with initial condition V 0 = y 0 . From the uniqueness of a solution to the above SDE, we infer that V t = y t ≤ x t for every t ∈ [0, τ ′ ]. In particular, V τ ′ = y τ ′ = x τ ′ and thus τ ′ is a rational exercise time for the holder of C a .
Remark 3.4. From the proof of Theorem 3.4 (see, in particular, equation (38) ), the inequality V τ ′ (x 2 − p, ψ) ≥ x τ ′ and the strict comparison property of E g,h , we see that when the equality p r,h (x 2 , C a ) = p s,h (x 2 , C a ) holds, then for any rational exercise time given by Definition 3.6 we have that V τ (x 2 − p r,h , ψ) = x τ , meaning that a rational exercise time is also a holder's break-even time. It is also obvious that a holder's break-even time is a rational exercise time. Thus when the equality p r,h (x 2 , C a ) = p s,h (x 2 , C a ) holds, then the inequality V τ (x 2 − p r,h , ψ) ≥ x τ in Definition 3.6 can be replaced by the equality V τ (x 2 − p r,h , ψ) = x τ . Once again, it is worth noting that this observation is fully consistent with the standard definition of a rational exercise time for the holder of an American option in a classical complete, linear market model, such as the Black and Scholes model.
